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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It seems intuitive that all inhabitants of the earth are inherently entitled to 
the protection of their human rights.  The term human rights contemplates a 
range of privileges, such as the right to life, the right to freedom of assembly, 
the right to privacy, the right to freedom of movement, the right to form and 
join trade unions and the right to strike, among a multitude of others.1  States 
previously shouldered the full responsibility of protecting human rights for 
their respective citizens.2  With the rise of big business in the last century, an 
interplay has naturally arisen between transnational corporations and the hu-
man rights of citizens whose countries the corporations inhabit.  Therefore, 
international law has been forced to become more involved in the protection 
of human rights and the regulation of potentially harmful actions by multina-
tional corporations.3  Recent studies estimate that transnational corporations 
currently compose over one-half of the world’s 100 largest economic entities.4  
To give an example of the growth of these massive transnational corporations, 
Exxon was ranked forty-fifth on the list of the 100 largest economic entities, 
“making it comparable in economic size to the economies of Chile or Paki-
stan.”5 
With this great economic influence comes great responsibility.  Multina-
tional corporations are, and should be, expected to comply with basic human 
rights standards.  Multinational corporations, however, “enjoy a de facto im-
munity that protects them against . . . challenges.”6  Individuals must invoke 
civil liability of a multinational corporation at the national level “either in the 
corporation’s country of origin or in its host country.”7  With this in mind, the 
United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the United Na-
tions Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) in June 2011 
in an attempt to broaden regulation of multinational corporations, to heighten 
 
 1 How Can Businesses Impact Human Rights?, SHIFT (Feb. 2015), https://www.shiftpro 
ject.org/resources/publications/how-can-businesses-impact-human-rights/. 
 2 Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and Interna-
tional Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2003). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Sarah Anderson & John Cavanaugh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power, 
GLOB. POLICY FORUM, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221/472 
11.html. 
 5 Press Release, Are Transnationals Bigger Than Countries?, UNITED NATIONS CONF. 
ON TRADE AND DEV. (Aug. 12, 2002), https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressReleaseArchive.as 
px?ReferenceDocId=2426. 
 6 Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses: A Guide for Victims and NGOs 
on Recourse Mechanisms, Section II: Judicial Mechanisms 179, INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (May 2016), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/guide_entreprises_uk-sectionii.pdf. 
 7 Id. 
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standards at the corporate level, and to facilitate easier access to remedies for 
victims of human rights violations by these types of corporations.8 
The inception of guidelines regarding corporations and human rights fol-
lowed egregious violations of human rights by multinational corporations.  
For example, in 2005, Nike released information relating to human rights vi-
olations perpetrated in its own factories.9  Nike owns factories in Asia, South 
America, Australia, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, just 
to name a few.10  Nike admitted that, after performing an audit of hundreds of 
factories in 2003 and 2004, it found cases of physical and verbal abusive treat-
ment as well as 25% to 50% of factories restricting access to toilets and drink-
ing water during the workday.11  The same percentage of factories required 
employees to work seven-day weeks, and in up to 25% of the factories, wages 
were below the legal minimum.12  Sadly, Nike is a salient example of the hu-
man rights abuses that occur in many of the multinational corporations that 
exist today. 
Despite the promulgation of the UNGP, human rights violations continue 
to occur across the globe.  According to written evidence by the Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, the majority of human rights violations occur 
extraterritorially in regions where victims have trouble attaining a remedy.13  
For example, as recently as 2016, British multinational corporation BK Gulf, 
co-owned by Balfour Beatty and one of Britain’s largest construction firms, 
has been accused of human rights violations in Qatar.14  Nepalese laborers in 
Qatar claimed that for almost three months they endured dire living condi-
tions, were not paid for their labor, had their passports confiscated, and were 
not allowed to leave Qatar against their will.15  Even more recently, the United 
Kingdom High Court dismissed a case against Shell brought by two destitute 
 
 8 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, SHIFT, https://www.shiftpro-
ject.org/un-guiding-principles/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
 9 David Teather, Nike Lists Abuses at Asian Factories, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2005), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/apr/14/ethicalbusiness.money. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Written Evidence from the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, BUS. & 
HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR. (July 2016), http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/commit-
teeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-rights-committee/human-rights-and-business/ 
written/34977.html. 
 14 Stephen Russell, British Companies Accused of Human Rights Abuse in Qatar, PLAY 
FAIR QATAR (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.playfairqatar.org.uk/british-companies-accused-
of-human-rights-abuse-in-qatar/. 
 15 Pete Pattison & Gyanu Adhikari, BK Gulf Dragged Its Heels over Qatar Labour 
Abuses, Claim Migrant Workers, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/global-development/2016/aug/25/bk-gulf-labour-abuses-qatar-migrant-workers-
nepal-balfour-beatty. 
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communities in the Niger Delta.16  Tens of thousands of Nigerians were af-
fected by oil pollution that occurred due to the operations of Shell’s subsidi-
ary, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC).17  The United Kingdom 
High Court decided that the suit could not proceed in the United Kingdom due 
to jurisdictional issues.18  These are only a few examples of the obstacles that 
individuals, hurt by multinational corporations and their subsidiaries domi-
ciled in the United Kingdom, encounter when they seek a remedy for human 
rights violations. 
According to John Ruggie, the creator of the UNGP, the root of the prob-
lem that exists in business and human rights “lies in the governance gaps cre-
ated by globalization—between the scope and impact of economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences.”19  
Ruggie’s tripartite framework, developed to address the problem of human 
rights violations perpetrated by multinational corporations, includes the 
state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, the corpo-
rate duty to respect human rights, and the need for access to effective remedy 
for victims of these violations.20  Studies have shown that States have fallen 
short of the remedy requirement of the UNGP.21  Ruggie himself has com-
mented on the obstacles victims face in attempting to attain remedy, stating: 
Some complainants have sought remedy outside the State 
where the harm occurred . . . but have faced extensive obsta-
cles.  Costs may be prohibitive . . . non-citizens may lack legal 
standing; and claims may be barred by statutes of limitations.  
Matters are further complicated if the claimant is seeking re-
dress from a parent corporation for actions by a foreign sub-
sidiary. . . .  These obstacles may deter claims or leave the vic-
tim with a remedy that is difficult to enforce.22 
 
 16 Joe Westby, An Elusive Justice: Holding Parent Companies Accountable for Human 
Rights Abuse, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 26, 2017), http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/39623-
an-elusive-justice-holding-parent-companies-accountable-for-human-rights-abuse. 
 17 Adam Vaughan, Nigerian Oil Pollution Claims Against Shell Cannot Be Heard in 
UK, Court Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2017/jan/26/nigerian-oil-pollution-shell-uk-corporations. 
 18 Id. 
    19 John Ruggie, Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 20 Harri Kalimo & Tim Staal, “Softness” in International Instruments: The Case of 
Transnational Corporations, 41 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 257, 309 (2014). 
 21 Caitlin Daniel et al., Remedy Remains Rare: An Analysis of 15 Years of NCP Cases 
and Their Contribution to Improve Access to Remedy for Victims of Corporate Misconduct, 
OECD WATCH 1, 5 (June 2015), https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/ 
2015/06/Remedy-Remains-Rare.pdf. 
 22 Ruggie, supra note 19. 
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The significance of the States’ failure to comply with the remedy require-
ment is reflected in the central theme of the Sixth Annual Forum on Business 
and Human Rights: “Realizing Access to Effective Remedy.”23 
This Note will discuss the background of the UNGP, will analyze whether 
the United Kingdom’s response to the UNGP adequately fulfills the third 
prong: providing access to remedy, and will suggest solutions to fill the gaps 
through which some victims of human rights abuses by multinational corpo-
rations seeking a remedy might slip.  Although the United Kingdom was the 
first nation to promulgate and update a National Action Plan in response to 
the UNGP24 and has since updated that plan,25 the language of both plans is 
relatively vague as to the steps the United Kingdom has taken, and will take, 
to provide an accessible remedy to individuals who are subjected to human 
rights violations by multinational corporations domiciled in the United King-
dom.  It is the position of this Note that the current remedies available to vic-
tims in the United Kingdom fall short of the UNGP.  However, these short-
comings could potentially be solved by broadening liability of parent 
corporations for tortious actions of their foreign subsidiaries, narrowly revis-
ing regulations that make it difficult for claimants to pursue remedy in UK 
courts, expanding funding for the National Contact Point System, bolstering 
its ability to provide an enforceable remedy, and creating hard law that re-
quires multinational corporations to have sufficient operational-level griev-
ance mechanisms in place. 
First, this Note will discuss the political and social landscape that gave rise 
to the UNGP, and the initial purpose of the guidelines.  Next, it will examine 
the UNGP’s specific requirements regarding the remedy that the UNGP en-
courage states and individual corporations to provide.  Then, this Note will 
explore how the United Kingdom has responded to the UNGP, both judicially 
and non-judicially.  The Note will then analyze the limitations that exist in the 
United Kingdom’s provision of remedy under the UNGP and further discuss 
alternative solutions that might maximize the provision of remedy for human 
rights violations perpetrated by multinational corporations.  Finally, this Note 
will conclude by summarizing the shortcomings and possible solutions re-
garding remedy for human rights violations by multinational corporations in 
the United Kingdom. 
 
 23  Programme, 2017 U.N. FORUM ON BUS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession6/PoW.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). 
 24 Leslie Esbrook & Emily Holland, New National Action Plan on UN Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights Launched, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www. 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=523ee1a7-76a3-4381-b17c-d998137db12e. 
 25 UK Publishes Updated National Action Plan on Business & Human Rights, HUMAN 
ANALYTICS (May 12, 2016), http://human-analytics.net/uk-publishes-updated-national-ac-
tion-plan-business-human-rights/. 
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II.   BACKGROUND 
A. Development of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 
 
The need for a framework on businesses’ behavior regarding human rights 
arose in the 1990s with the expansion of oil, gas, and mining companies as 
well as the offshore production of clothing and footwear.26  These develop-
ments provoked concern about working conditions in these multinational cor-
porations.27  In 2005, following a failed initiative to set forth a code of conduct 
for transnational corporations and human rights, the Secretary General ap-
pointed John Gerard Ruggie as Special Representative for Business and Hu-
man Rights with the hope that he would reattempt to create a comprehensive 
guide for business behavior in the realm of human rights.28  Ruggie’s formu-
lation of the UNGP framework occurred in three phases: the first phase fo-
cused on identifying and clarifying existing standards and practices; the sec-
ond phase created a cohesive and comprehensive system for regulating 
business and human rights; and the third phase required Ruggie to provide 
“concrete and practical recommendations” for implementing the framework.29  
As a result of the second phase of this process, Ruggie proposed a framework 
on business and human rights to the UN Human Rights Council in 2008 that 
eventually became the UNGP.30  Ruggie’s formulation of these preliminary 
principles included what has become known as the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework.”31  The proposed framework included three pillars: 
“1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, in-
cluding business; 2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and 
3) greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judi-
cial.”32 
 
 26 Ruggie, supra note 19. 
 27 Id. 
    28  John Ruggie, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fac-
ulty/john-ruggie (last visited Aug. 14, 2019); Business and Human Rights: Together at 
Last? A Conversation with John Ruggie, THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 
http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2016/9/6/business-and-human-rights-together-at-
last-a-conversation-with-john-ruggie (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
 29 John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 
(March 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AE 
V.pdf. 
 30 UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, BUS. & 
HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CENTRE, https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-
special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-frame-
work-and-guiding-principles (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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The Human Rights Council unanimously accepted the framework.  This 
was the first time a UN intergovernmental body had taken a position on this 
policy issue.33  One country from each UN regional group sponsored the res-
olution authorizing Ruggie’s framework, including Norway as the primary 
sponsor, and Argentina, India, Nigeria, and Russia as co-sponsors.34  Ruggie 
was then tasked with the third phase of the process, putting the framework 
into action, and three years later he proposed the UNGP as a manifestation of 
that framework.  The Human Rights Council officially endorsed the UNGP in 
2011.35 
 
B. Access to Remedy Under the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights Framework 
 
The UNGP for Business and Human rights set forth the remedy require-
ment in plain terms.36  Guiding Principle 25, the foundational principle re-
garding the remedy, asserts that “[States] must take appropriate steps to en-
sure, through judicial, administrative, legislative,  or other appropriate means, 
that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or  jurisdiction those 
affected have access to effective remedy.”37 
The principle makes plain that the provision of the remedy is mandatory.  
In fact, each State has an international legal obligation, within its territory and 
jurisdiction, to ensure that a remedy exists for those who are victims of cor-
porate human rights violations.38  The commentary to the foundational prin-
ciple further clarifies that states have an affirmative duty to protect against 
human rights abuse perpetrated by multinational corporations and provides 
examples of remedies that states may provide.39  According to the commen-
tary, states have a variety of options when it comes to remedies, such as “apol-
ogies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and 
punitive sanctions . . . as well as the prevention of harm through . . . injunctions 
 
 33 Ruggie, supra note 19. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 
2011), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/un-human- 
rights-council-resolution-re-human-rights-transnational-corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf. 
 36 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/31 (March 
21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf. 
 37 Id. at 22. 
 38 Robert McCorquodale, Survey of the Provision in the United Kingdom of Access to 
Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Harms Involving Business Enterprises, BRITISH 
INST. INT’L & COMP. L. (July 17, 2015), https://www.biicl.org/documents/724_uk_ac-
cess_to_remedies.pdf?showdocument=1. 
 39 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, supra note 36, at 22. 
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or guarantees of non-repetition.”40  The state must provide remedies that ef-
fectively prevent the harm from occurring again.41 
The commentary also defines what constitutes a harm committed by a mul-
tinational corporation.42  Grievances are defined by the commentary as “a per-
ceived injustice evoking an individual’s or a group’s sense of entitlement, 
which may be based on law, contract, explicit or implicit promises, customary 
practice, or general notions of fairness of aggrieved communities.”43  The 
commentary also provides that grievance mechanisms may be judicial or non-
judicial and that states must make a good-faith effort to “facilitate public 
awareness” about these grievance mechanisms so that injured parties are 
aware of the remedies available to them.44 
“Barriers to . . . remedy can be legal, social, financial, practical or proce-
dural.”45  Legal barriers may include claimants’ inability to access home state 
courts even with a meritorious claim or the exclusion of particular groups from 
the same protections afforded to other groups in society.46  Practical or proce-
dural barriers are issues such as costs deterring one from bringing an action, 
a lack of resources or incentive for advocates to represent claimants, or inad-
equate options for class action or collective action proceedings.47  The UNGP 
require states make the remedies they provide to victims of human rights vio-
lations effective and accessible in order to avoid these barriers.48  Guiding 
Principle 26, the first of the Operational Principles, and notably the only Guid-
ing Principle that is stated in mandatory terms,49 addresses state-based judicial 
mechanisms, and provides that: 
States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness 
of domestic judicial  mechanisms when addressing business-
related human rights abuses, including considering  ways to 
reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could 
lead to a denial of  access to remedy.50 
To an extent, the UNGP also define how the judicial mechanisms should 
operate.51  Effectiveness of judicial mechanisms, according to the principle, 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 3. 
 46 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, supra note 36, at 23-24. 
 47 Id. at 23. 
 48 Id. at 22. 
 49 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 5. 
 50 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, supra note 36, at 23. 
 51 Id. 
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depends on “impartiality, integrity, and ability to accord due process” to vic-
tims.52  This due process is afforded in three stages: access, procedures, and 
outcome.  The UNGP indicate that States should afford “particular attention” 
to marginalized groups of people who might “face additional cultural, social, 
physical and financial impediments to accessing, using and benefitting from 
these mechanisms.”53  For example, studies show that women in the cocoa 
sector are paid significantly less than men, are less available to participate in 
training due to their commitments at home, and do not complain about viola-
tions of their human rights for fear of being fired.54  Women in these situations 
are both more vulnerable to human rights abuses and less likely to feel incen-
tivized to report them.55  According to the UNGP, corporations are to have a 
heightened sensitivity and a protocol in place to respond to these types of sit-
uations.56 
Guiding Principle 27, which addresses state-based non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms, explains that States must provide “effective and appropriate 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms . . . as a part of a comprehensive State-
based system for the remedy of business-related human rights abuse.”57  Non-
judicial mechanisms include administrative and legislative mechanisms and 
are meant to supplement judicial mechanisms in order to provide a compre-
hensive system of remedies.58  According to Guiding Principle 28, states are 
also responsible under the third pillar of the framework for facilitating “access 
to effective non-State-based grievance mechanisms dealing with business-re-
lated human rights harms.”59  This principle contemplates mechanisms that 
operate within a business enterprise.60  These types of mechanisms are ex-
tremely valuable because they offer a quicker outcome, lower costs, or trans-
national reach.61  Another type of non-State-based mechanism offers a remedy 
through regional and international human rights bodies.62  A state’s duty in 
relation to these organizations is to raise awareness and facilitate access to 
these options.63 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 24. 
 54 Rachel Wilshaw et al., Business and Human Rights: An Oxfam Perspective on the UN 
Guiding Principles, OXFAM TECH. BRIEFING 1, 5 (June 2013), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/ 
www.oxfam.org/files/tb-business-human-rights-oxfam-perspective-un-guiding-principles 
-130613-en.pdf. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, supra note 36, at 24. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 25. 
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The UNGP also specifically address duties that business enterprises have 
regarding the provision of remedy for human rights violations.64  According 
to Guiding Principle 29, business enterprises have the opportunity to directly 
address and remedy the harm that results from a human rights violation by 
“establish[ing] or participat[ing] in effective operational-level grievance 
mechanisms for individuals and communities who may be adversely im-
pacted.”65  There are two key functions that operational-level grievance mech-
anisms must perform: they must 
 1) . . . support the identification of adverse human rights im-
pacts as a part of [the] enterprise’s on-going human rights due 
diligence . . . by providing a channel for those directly im-
pacted by the enterprise’s operations to raise concerns when 
they believe they are being or will be adversely impacted [and] 
2) . . . make it possible for grievances, once identified, to be 
addressed and for adverse impacts to be remediated early and 
directly by the business enterprise, thereby preventing harms 
from compounding and grievances from escalating.66 
Corporations are also required to have initiatives that advance human 
rights-related standards, and these initiatives should make remedies accessi-
ble.67  The final guiding principle sets forth effectiveness criteria for non-ju-
dicial grievance mechanisms.68  The criteria states that in order for non-judi-
cial grievance mechanisms to be effective, they must be legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible (meaning they ensure 
that outcomes are in line with recognized human rights), a source of continu-
ous learning, and based on engagement and dialogue.69 
 
C. The United Kingdom’s Response to the United Nation’s Guiding 
Principles 
 
Following the United Nation’s endorsement of the UNGP, the United Na-
tions Human Rights Council called on all member states of the United Nations 
to develop a National Action Plan to organize the implementation of the 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 26. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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UNGP.70  On September 4, 2013, the United Kingdom was one of the first 
nations to release a National Action Plan to implement the UNGP.71  Accord-
ing to Foreign Secretary William Hague, the goal of the National Action Plan 
was to “ensure that British companies succeed . . . in a manner that is con-
sistent with this country’s deeply held values of human rights and individual 
dignity.”72  The United Kingdom’s National Action Plan begins with an intro-
duction that details how protecting human rights actually benefits busi-
nesses.73  The document states that businesses receive benefits by respecting 
rights.  These benefits include enhancement of the company’s reputation and 
brand value, an increase in customer base, an increase and retention of staff, 
maintenance of longevity, reduction of the risk of costly litigation, and in-
creased appeal to institutional investors.74  The primary purpose of the Na-
tional Action Plan, according to its text, is to help companies achieve these 
benefits by providing a clear delineation of the Government’s expectations of 
companies regarding human rights.75 
The National Action Plan addresses each of the three pillars of the UNGP 
individually.76  Regarding remedy, the document first states that the United 
Kingdom currently provides remedies through its judiciary system, through 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms such as internal company grievance pro-
cedures, arbitration, adjudication, mediation, conciliation, and negotiation.77  
The action plan addresses remedy briefly in comparison to its treatment of the 
other two pillars.  In addition to the existing judicial and non-judicial 
 
 70 Assessments of Existing National Action Plans (NAPs) on Business and Human 
Rights, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 2017), https://static1.squarespa 
ce.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/599c543ae9bfdf40b5b6f055/1503417406364/
NAP+Assessment+Aug+2017+FINAL.pdf. 
 71 Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 
Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
HM GOV’T 2, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/522805/Good_Business_Implementing_the_UN_Guiding_ 
Principles_on_Business_and_Human_Rights_updated_May_2016.pdf (last updated May 
2016). 
 72 William Hague, Speech: UK Action Plan on Business and Human Rights (Sept. 5, 
2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-action-plan-on-business-and-human-
rights--2. 
    73 Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 
Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
HM GOV’T (Sept. 2013), https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media 
/documents/uk-national-action-plan-sep-2013.pdf. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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mechanisms already in place, it states that the United Kingdom has promoted 
access to remedy in that it has: 
task[ed] UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) teams in the mar-
kets where they operate to advise UK companies on establish-
ing or participating in grievance mechanisms for those poten-
tially affected by their activities and to collaborate with local 
authorities in situations where further State action is warranted 
to provide an effective remedy[;] 
encourage[d] companies to extend their domestic UK practice 
of providing effective grievance mechanisms to their overseas 
operations, adapting them where necessary according to local 
circumstances and consulting interested parties. . . . [and] 
support[ed] projects through the FCO Human Rights and De-
mocracy Programme Fund relating to work on remedy proce-
dures in other countries . . . .78 
In response to the UNGP’s requirements regarding corporations, the Na-
tional Action Plan “encourages companies to review their existing grievance 
procedures to ensure they are fair, transparent, understandable, well-publi-
cised [sic] and accessible by all, and provide for grievances to be resolved 
effectively without fear of victimization.”79 
In May 2016, the United Kingdom updated its National Action Plan for 
four purported reasons: 
1)  to “record the achievements the Government has made, and 
actions . . . taken” since the National Action Plan was initially 
promulgated; 
2) to “reflect the developments which have taken place at the 
international level since the UK’s National Action Plan was 
first published, including guidance on implementation and the 
experience of other countries;” 
3) to “set out the role Government can play in helping busi-
ness[es] to fulfill [their] responsibility to respect human rights 
. . . ;” [and] 
 
   78 Id. 
   79 Id. 
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4) to “support the role Government can play in . . . the provi-
sion of remedy which is available to those who feel they are 
victims of business-related human rights abuses.”80 
Although the updated National Action Plan explicitly states that part of the 
motivation behind the update is to focus on providing victims with access to 
remedy and reducing barriers to judicial and non-judicial remedies, the Na-
tional Action Plan offers little in the way of material steps that the U.K. gov-
ernment has taken to follow through with this promise.81  The Update restates 
the remedies already provided judicially and non-judicially and discusses how 
it has attempted to encourage corporations to make remedies available to vic-
tims on an operational-level.82  Some of these efforts include working with 
UK Trade and Investment to “advise UK companies on establishing or partic-
ipating in grievance mechanisms,” “encourag[ing] companies to extend their 
domestic UK practice of providing effective grievance mechanisms to their 
overseas operations,” and “support[ing] projects through the FCO Human 
Rights and Democracy Programme Fund on work on remedy procedures in 
other countries.”83  These efforts will be analyzed later in this Note along with 
the current available remedies provided by multinational corporations. 
 
1. Judicial Remedies 
 
It is necessary to briefly discuss these judicial and non-judicial mecha-
nisms, as the UK’s National Action Plan relies heavily on remedies already 
provided judicially and non-judicially.  The first judicial mechanism available 
is a tort claim.84  For these types of wrongs, claimants will most likely bring 
a negligence claim, and must prove that: 
1) The defendant acted or omitted to act. 
2) The act or omission caused loss and damage to the claimant. 
 
 80 Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 
Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
HM GOV’T 2, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/522805/Good_Business_Implementing_the_UN_Guiding_Pri 
nciples_on_Business_and_Human_Rights_updated_May_2016.pdf (last updated May 
2016). 
 81 Id. at 20-21. 
 82 Id. at 21. 
 83 Id. 
 84 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 14. 
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3) In all the circumstances the defendant owed a duty of care 
to act or not to act. . . . 
4) The defendant’s actions or omissions breached the duty of 
care . . . . [and] 
5) The loss and damage was sufficiently foreseeable . . . .85 
A tort claim could also be brought on the basis of nuisance, trespass to the 
person, or privacy.86  If the abuse occurs in the United Kingdom, the claimant 
may be able to invoke a range of statutory torts, under laws such as the Em-
ployers Liability Act 1969, the Occupiers Liability Acts of 1957 and 1984, or 
the Environmental Protection Act of 1990.87  In any tort claim where both the 
victim and location of the abuse is overseas, which is highly likely in the con-
text of a multinational corporation’s violation of human rights, the claimant 
must also prove jurisdiction and applicable law.88  The Brussels I Regulation 
allows EU member states in which the defendant is domiciled to obtain juris-
diction to hear a dispute no matter the defendant’s nationality.89  Therefore, 
companies who are incorporated in the United Kingdom may be liable to in-
jured parties under UK law. 
Claimants may also have the opportunity to bring an action against a cor-
poration based on contract law.90  These claims will be limited to contract 
terms that may define venue and choice of law.91  Contract claims relevant to 
human rights abuses may arise under employment issues or in regard to de-
tention in a UK business-owned prison.92 
A claimant might also pursue a judicial remedy under criminal law93 if a 
corporation violated a criminal statute in its commission of a human rights 
offense.94  For example, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act 2007 is a statute that might apply to a corporate human rights violation.95  
This statute provides that a corporation can be convicted of corporate man-
slaughter when someone dies as a result of the way the business is managed.96  
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 15-16. 
 87 Id. at 16. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Council Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1. 
 90 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 19. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 20. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 21. 
 96 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, c.19, §§ 19(1), 1(4) 
(Eng.). 
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Other statutes that may allow claims for human rights abuses by corporations 
include the Bribery Act 2010, the Serious Crime Act 2007, and the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015.97 
Employment tribunals are another form of judicial structure that claimants 
might utilize.  Labor condition violations are most likely to fall into this cate-
gory.98  The UNGP, in Principle 12, makes clear that States are to protect labor 
rights, which include the right to safe conditions of work, fair remuneration, 
non-discrimination at work, and freedom of association.99  Employment tri-
bunals have jurisdiction solely for claims that arise under legislation.100  These 
claims are typically for violations such as unfair dismissal, payment claims, 
claims about working conditions, and protection from discrimination.101  Em-
ployment tribunals have jurisdiction for claims where: 1) one of the respond-
ents conducts business in the United Kingdom, 2) one or more of the viola-
tions took place in the United Kingdom, 3) the claim arises under a contract 
that concerns work that has been performed at least partly in the United King-
dom, or  4) there is a connection with the United Kingdom, which considera-
bly broadens the scope of claims that can be brought.102 
 
2.  Non-Judicial Remedies 
 
There are also a variety of non-judicial mechanisms available to victims of 
human rights violations by multinational corporations.103  The National Con-
tact Point system is the primary mechanism that allows injured parties to bring 
a claim.104  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), an international body whose mission is to “promote policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world,”105 
promulgated a human rights chapter and policies on due diligence into its 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which are similar in content 
to the UNGP.106  The OECD Guidelines require States to set up National Con-
tact Points to “promote and implement the OECD Guidelines.”107  Govern-
ments are afforded flexibility in how they set up their National Contact Points, 
but they are required to be “visible, accessible, transparent, and 
 
 97 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 21-22. 
 98 Id. at 25. 
 99 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, supra note 36, at 13. 
 100 See Employment Tribunals Act 1996, c. 17, § 2 (UK). 
 101 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 25. 
 102 Id. at 26. 
 103 Id. at 30. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. (citation omitted). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
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accountable.”108  This mechanism has proven to be important in the realm of 
human rights.  For example, most actions brought under the National Contact 
Point system since 2011 have involved human rights violations.109  The 
United Kingdom National Contact Point is housed in the Department of Busi-
ness, Innovation, and Skills, and is maintained by a Steering Board.110  Com-
plaints can be brought to the United Kingdom National Contact Point system 
by an interested party, a trade union, a NGO or other entity on behalf of the 
injured party.111  The complaint must be in accordance with the OECD Guide-
lines.112  The National Contact Point will perform an initial assessment of the 
merits of the complaint, then confirm the acceptance of the complaint with the 
complainant, notify the company named in the complaint, and afford the com-
pany twenty days to respond.113  The National Contact Point will often offer 
mediation to the parties in hopes to resolve the issue and remedy the wrong.114  
Following the resolution of the issue, a final statement will be released by the 
National Contact Point.115 
Another non-judicial remedy available to victims of human rights abuses 
by corporations in certain industries domiciled in the United Kingdom is the 
Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), which was created following the 
promulgation of the Gangmasters Licensing Act of 2004 (GLA Act).116  Since 
2014, the GLA has operated under the Home Office “in order to link it more 
directly to the law enforcement branches of government.”117  The GLA en-
forces proper labor standards in the agriculture, horticulture, and shellfish 
gathering industries, as well as any industry that deals with processing and 
packaging.118  Companies doing business in these areas must obtain a license 
through the GLA, and in order to do so, must show that they satisfy eight areas 
 
 108 Id. (quoting OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ORGANISATION FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 78 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323. 
pdf). 
 109 Id. at 31. 
 110 Id. at 30 (citing UK National Contact Point (UK NCP) for the OECD’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/uk-national-
contact-point-for-the-organisation-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-guide-
lines). 
  111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 30-31. 
 113 UK National Contact Point Procedures for Dealing with Complaints Brought Under 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & 
SKILLS 1, 10 (Jan. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/270577/bis-14-518-procedural-guidance.pdf. 
 114 Id. at 15. 
 115 Id. at 18. 
 116 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 34. 
 117 Id. (citation omitted). 
 118 What We Do, GANGMASTERS & LABOUR ABUSE AUTH. (2017), http://www.gla.gov.uk/ 
who-we-are/what-we-do/. 
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of practice: “fit and proper test; pay and tax matters; prevention of forced la-
bour and mistreatment of workers; accommodation; working conditions; 
health and safety; recruiting workers and contractual arrangements; and sub-
contracting and using other labour providers.”119  The GLA Act created four 
offenses for human rights violations under the Act: 
1) Operating as a gangmaster without a license; 
2) Obtaining or possessing a false license or false documenta-
tion which is likely to cause  another person to believe that a 
person acting as a gangmaster is licensed; 
3) Entering into an arrangement with an unlicensed gangmas-
ter; and 
4) Obstructing a GLA enforcement officer who is carrying out 
his duties under the GLA  Act.120 
Penalties for violations of the GLA range from six to ten years imprison-
ment and/or a fine.121  To ensure that the licensing standards are being upheld, 
inspections are conducted on a random basis.122 
Victims may also bring claims through the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC), a public body created under the Equality Act of 2006 
that has the purpose of “challeng[ing] discrimination, promot[ing] equality of 
opportunity and protect[ing] human rights.”123  The EHRC is technically a 
non-judicial body, but it can bring judicial review proceedings “to provide 
legal assistance to victims of discrimination, to intervene in or institute legal 
proceedings, including judicial review, and to make applications to court for 
injunctions” for a range of issues, including employment.124 
In some circumstances, Ombudsman Offices also serve as a forum for vic-
tims of human rights violations by multinational corporations to file com-
plaints.  Parliament created the Ombudsman to serve as a complaint handling 
service for complaints that have not been resolved by government depart-
ments of the United Kingdom.125  The Ombudsman’s services are reviewed 
 
 119 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 34. 
 120 Id. at 34-35 (citing Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, c. 11, §§ 12-13, 18 (UK)). 
 121 Id. at 35 (citing Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, c. 11, § 12 (UK)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Who We Are, EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, https://www.equalityhuman-
rights.com/en/about-us/who-we-are (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 124 Court Action, EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, https://www.equalityhuman-
rights.com/en/court-action (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 125 What We Do, PARLIAMENTARY AND HEALTH SERV. OMBUDSMAN, https://www.om-
budsman.org.uk/about-us/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
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by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee.126  Om-
budsman offices that can hear human rights violations are the Children’s 
Commissioners for England, Scotland, and Wales and, importantly, the Infor-
mation Commissioner’s Office, which “deals with complaints concerning in-
formation and privacy rights.”127 
The final non-judicial mechanism providing a remedy to victims of human 
rights violations by multinational corporations is the Groceries Code Adjudi-
cator (GCA).  The GCA was established by the Groceries Code Adjudicator 
Act of 2013.128  The GCA can address violations specifically in reference to 
supermarkets and their suppliers, and it ensures “that regulated retailers treat 
their direct suppliers lawfully and fairly.”129  Parties can complain to the GCA 
through a formal process, and if they are unhappy with the decision made by 
the Head of Office, the complaint will be reviewed by an Adjudicator who 
reviews the complaint and issues a final outcome letter.130  If the complainant 
is still unhappy, he or she will be given details of how to complain to the 
Ombudsman.131 
 
3.   Business/Internal Grievance Mechanisms 
 
The UNGP also mandate that corporations facilitate access to remedy at 
an operational-level.132  According to the UNGP, operational-level grievance 
mechanisms must be “legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transpar-
ent, rights-compatible, and a source of continuous learning.”133  Many UK 
companies have only just begun to develop operational-level grievance mech-
anisms in the last decade in response to the promulgation of the UNGP.134  
 
 126 The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC), 
PARLIAMENTARY AND HEALTH SERV. OMBUDSMAN, https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/mak-
ing-complaint/information-mps/our-role-and-relationship-parliament/public-administra-
tion-and-constitutional-affairs-committee-pacac (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
 127 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 39. 
 128 Id. at 41 (citing Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 2013, c. 19, §1 (UK)). 
 129 About Us, GROCERIES CODE ADJUDICATOR, https://www.gov.uk/government/organi-
sations/groceries-code-adjudicator/about (last visited Sept. 23, 2019). 
 130 Groceries Code Adjudicator Complaints Policy, GROCERIES CODE ADJUDICATOR, 1, 
2, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557614/ 
GCA_Complaints_Policy_-_Final.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Sec’y of State for Foreign Commonwealth and Affairs, supra note 73. 
 133 Civil Society and Corporate Lawyers Should Work Together on Human Rights Due 
Diligence, BUS. & HUM. RIGHTS RESOURCE CTR., https://www.business-human-
rights.org/en/civil-society-and-corporate-lawyers-should-work-together-on-human-rights-
due-diligence (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
 134 JUAN JOSÉ ÁLVAREZ RUBI & KATERINA YIANNIBAS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BUSINESS: 
REMOVAL OF BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 81 (Routledge ed., 
1st ed. 2017). 
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Unfortunately, as noted by the United Nations Working Group “research in 
the field of business and human rights lacks comprehensive data on the num-
ber and nature of complaints against companies for their adverse impacts and 
the effectiveness of the bodies tasked with investigating and remediating those 
impacts.”135  Although operational-level grievance mechanisms will look dif-
ferent from company to company, under the UNGP, UK corporations have 
relatively stringent guideposts as to how these remedial structures should op-
erate. 
III.   ANALYSIS 
A. Limitations on Judicial Remedies in the United Kingdom 
 
John Ruggie himself has commented on the difficulty victims of human 
rights violations face in attaining a remedy, even after the promulgation of the 
UNGP, stating that the “patchwork of mechanisms,” including judicial, non-
judicial, and corporate-level, “remains incomplete and flawed” and “must be 
improved in its parts and as a whole.”136  In order to evaluate the efficacy, or 
lack thereof, of access to remedy for human rights violations by multinational 
corporations in the United Kingdom, it will be useful to follow the path one 
might take through the available remedies. 
A victim of a severe human rights violation by a multinational corporation 
would most likely turn to the judicial system.137  In evaluating judicial reme-
dies, it is crucial to bear in mind that the UNGP require States to “ensure the 
effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms” and consider methods to re-
duce barriers to remedy.138  Because human rights violations often occur be-
yond the jurisdiction of the multinational corporation’s domicile, victims 
sometimes have difficulty attaining remedy for these types of claims.139  The 
UK’s provision of remedies extends to claims brought by victims who suf-
fered human rights violations outside of the United Kingdom, although there 
is no specific legislation that allows these claims.140 
 
 135 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/70/216 (July 30, 
2015). 
 136 Ruggie, supra note 19, at 22. 
 137 Improving Access to Remedy in the Area of Business and Human Rights at the EU 
Level: Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN UNION 
AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. 5 (Apr. 10, 2017), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files 
/fra_uploads/fra-2017-opinion-01-2017-business-human-rights_en.pdf. 
 138 Human Rights Council Res. 17/31, supra note 36, at 23. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Olivier De Schutter, Robert McCorquodale & Gwynne Skinner, The Third Pillar: Ac-
cess to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Businesses, 
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The primary way for claimants to bring claims for corporate-related human 
rights violations perpetrated in other jurisdictions is through tort law.141  The 
Brussels I Regulation applies to civil and commercial disputes, “regardless of 
the court or tribunal,” and to any individual “domiciled in one of the EU Mem-
ber States.”142  Pursuant to Article 63 of the Brussels I Regulation, “companies 
are considered to be domiciled in the place where they have their statutory 
seat, central administration, or principle place of business.”143  Therefore, vic-
tims of extraterritorial human rights violations can typically bring a tort claim 
against a corporation domiciled in an EU member state, such as the United 
Kingdom.144  However, these types of human rights violations are often per-
petrated by subsidiaries of multinational corporations that are technically 
domiciled in the United Kingdom.  Brussels I Regulation does not apply to 
subsidiaries.145  This is one of the major barriers that victims run into. 
This Note previously mentioned the recent decision by the UK High Court 
to dismiss a case brought against Shell by communities in the Niger Delta.  
These victims were seriously injured by oil spills caused by the alleged neg-
ligence of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., a subsid-
iary of Royal Dutch Shell.146  The victims were unable to attain a remedy in 
the High Court, “despite the company having profited from decades of abuses 
and environmental destruction in the Niger Delta.”147  The primary reason for 
the claim’s dismissal was the judge’s conclusion that there was no connection 
between the United Kingdom and what the judge determined to be a Nigerian 
company, though the company was a subsidiary of a corporation domiciled in 
the United Kingdom.148  The Shell case presents an example of a  claim 
“[w]here claimants face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access 
home State courts regardless of the merits of the claim.”149  Here, victims of 
human rights abuse were unable to pursue a claim in the United Kingdom 
based on the fact that it was the subsidiary, not Shell itself, that perpetrated 
the human rights abuse.  This appears to be what the UNGP document defines 
as a legal barrier. 
In cases involving very specific fact patterns, UK courts have chosen to 
hold parent companies liable for harmful actions of subsidiaries.  In the 
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landmark decision of Chandler v. Cape plc,150 the plaintiff suffered from as-
bestosis as a result of his exposure to asbestos fibers while working for Cape 
Building Products Limited, a subsidiary of Cape PLC.151  The Court of Ap-
peals held the plaintiff had a valid claim against the parent company because 
Cape PLC owed a direct duty of care to the plaintiff, despite the general rule 
that parent companies cannot be held liable for the actions of their subsidiar-
ies.152  The Court created a new rule, stating that responsibility of a parent 
company for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees may be im-
posed where: 
1. [T]he businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a rele-
vant respect the same; 
2.  the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on 
some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular in-
dustry; 
3. the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent com-
pany knew, or ought to have known; and 
4. the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary 
or its employees would rely on its using that superior 
knowledge for the employees’ protection.153 
The Court of Appeals allowing this exception to the general no-liability-
for-subsidiaries rule begs the question of whether liability can be broadened 
to hold more corporations accountable for the transgression of their subsidi-
aries, like in the Shell case.  On the other hand, creating liability for parent 
corporations who are more involved in the operations and specifically, in the 
promotion of health and safety of their subsidiaries, might create an incentive 
for corporations to take a more hands-off approach.  This is dangerous because 
it could lead to even more egregious violations of human rights by multina-
tional corporations.  However, if the rule is altered to implicate multinational 
corporations, including their subsidiaries, even where they do not have as 
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much of a hands-on approach, multinational corporations will be incentivized 
to focus more on preventing human rights abuses by their subsidiaries. 
The UNGP advise “States should ensure that they do not erect barriers to 
prevent legitimate cases from being brought before the courts in situations 
where judicial recourse is an essential part of accessing remedy or alternative 
sources of effective remedy are unavailable.”154  Given the importance of en-
suring access to remedy under the UNGP, the courts of the United Kingdom 
should expand the Chandler v. Cape rule, and lower the standard that currently 
exists for claimants to bring a claim against subsidiaries of multinational cor-
porations.  The result would be that corporations domiciled in the United 
Kingdom that have subsidiaries in foreign countries would become more in-
centivized to act carefully and to ensure that their subsidiaries were taking the 
proper precautions to guard against human rights violations. 
Another barrier that a victim seeking redress for a human rights violation 
in the judicial realm might encounter relates to the applicable law.155  Under 
the Rome II regulation, when a business domiciled in the European Union is 
sued for  human rights abuse abroad, the applicable law is the law of the State 
where the violation occurred.156  For the most part, damages will also be de-
termined based on the law of the state where the abuse occurred.157  This can 
have the effect of limiting the types of claims a plaintiff may bring and the 
amount of damages a plaintiff may receive in UK courts.  Additionally, the 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 made two 
crucial changes to Conditional Fee Agreements.158  These changes have neg-
ative implications for victims seeking remedy from human rights violations.  
First, the success fee, which is 100% except in personal injury cases, where it 
is 25%, must now be paid from the compensation awarded to the victims of 
abuse.159  Second, “the costs incurred by the winning sides’ legal team, which 
are recoverable from the losing side must now be ‘proportionate’ to the 
amount awarded in compensation.”160  These changes have enormous impli-
cations for claimants pursuing a remedy for human rights violations because, 
given the complex nature of these claims and the fact that they might involve 
up to thousands of claimants, costs might easily exceed the compensation 
awarded.161 
On a broader level, victims pursuing tort claims experience difficulties 
with the logistics of pursuing a claim that may involve two states.162  For 
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example, obtaining evidence in cases where an individual sues a subsidiary of 
a parent corporation is difficult because individuals might have difficulty 
identifying the correct defendant due to the “transnational nature of large cor-
porate groups, especially when coupled with a lack of transparency as to the 
ultimate ownership or control of companies.”163  Plaintiffs might also have 
trouble identifying all potential victims, especially where there may be “con-
siderable locational, language and logistical efforts” involved when attempt-
ing to sue a foreign subsidiary of a UK parent corporation.164  Additionally, 
victims occasionally run into problems when attempting to file a class action 
suit, as the processes for doing so under the Civil Procedure Rules of England 
and Wales are complex and have the potential to slow down litigation and 
increase costs.165  Unfortunately, this proves to be a profound problem for 
claimants such as Mr. John Gbei, who was one of the victims of Shell’s oil 
spill in Nigeria:166 
We decided to give it to a Nigerian lawyer . . . but unfortu-
nately the matter was with him for two years. He tried to go 
into negotiation with Shell rather than instituting the case in 
the court.  There was no outcome, no nothing, so after two 
years of the matter being with him the Bodo people decided to 
withdraw the power from him and give it to a London law firm, 
Leigh Day & Co . . . Also, given the Nigerian legal system, 
there would be delay, and it was a matter that needed urgent 
attention . . . If you had been to Bodo at that early stage of the 
spill, you would have discovered that the people were in a bad 
situation. You would have pitied us. A matter of such magni-
tude needed not to be delayed in the court.167 
Mr. Gbei’s testimony speaks to the real-life issues that claimants encounter 
when attempting to navigate jurisdiction, choice of law, and aggregating 
claims.  Human rights violations are often time-sensitive and the current legal 
landscape for these types of claims does not offer much expediency, to say 
the least. 
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While amending regulations to increase the speed of the judicial system 
and expand access to evidence in these types of cases would admittedly be 
difficult, the United Kingdom could, at the very least, make changes that 
would allow claimants to bring claims in UK courts using UK law.  This abil-
ity would allow claimants the opportunity to obtain a reasonable judgment 
and retain the majority of the damage award given in these cases.  To confront 
the difficulties that claimants like Mr. Gbei and his co-claimants might face, 
both the Rome II Regulation and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act should be reconsidered to promote fair and reasonable access 
to remedy in the United Kingdom.  The Rome II Regulation could be revised 
only as it pertains to claims made by victims of human rights violations per-
petrated by multinational corporations that are domiciled in the United King-
dom and could allow for the utilization of UK law in situations like these, 
where claimants would be adversely impacted by having to use the law of the 
country where the abuses occurred.  Similarly, the damages scheme of the 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act could be amended to 
provide that where, specifically in cases involving human rights violations 
perpetrated by multinational corporations, legal costs exceed the compensa-
tion awarded, the percentages allocated from the judgment are discretionary 
instead of mandatory.  In that case, judges would be able to prevent victims 
of human rights violations from leaving extremely expensive legal proceed-
ings with essentially no remedy for the severe damage they suffered at the 
hands of a multinational corporation. 
In very specific situations, victims of human rights violations might at-
tempt to sue under contract law.  This is only feasible where a contract speci-
fies the choice of law and jurisdiction that governs the contract.168  Similarly, 
victims typically have limited ability to invoke criminal law for these types of 
offenses because criminal offenses “are designed for natural persons and not 
legal persons,” and  proving mens rea of a corporation is difficult.169  In the 
limited circumstances where a corporation is found guilty of violating a stat-
utory criminal offense, such as when a private security business “unlawfully 
kill[s], torture[s] or detain[s]” someone, or a financial entity subsidizes a com-
pany that participates in forced labor, courts will look to the individuals that 
“direct the mind and will” of the business.170  In 2015, the United Kingdom 
created criminal liability, through the Modern Slavery Act of 2015, for corpo-
rations who are found to have dealt in human slavery and trafficking.171  Aside 
from this and a few other pieces of legislation that relate directly to the human 
rights context, victims do not have many available methods of recourse 
against multinational corporations in the criminal realm.  This is especially 
 
 168 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 19. 
 169 Id. at 20. 
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 171 Id. at 22 (citing Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 9 (UK)). 
2019] UNITED NATIONS GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 769 
true given that criminal law cannot be applied extraterritorially,172 which is 
problematic considering the majority of these human rights claims are based 
on actions by corporations acting in foreign countries.  The barrier faced by 
claimants who wish to hold multinational corporations accountable for crim-
inal actions should be mitigated by the fact that claimants may bring tort 
claims against multinational corporations and their subsidiaries where they 
have been injured by their criminal actions, especially if the suggestions made 
previously in this Note regarding barriers to tort claims are taken into consid-
eration. 
Victims of human rights violations, specifically relating to labor rights, 
have the opportunity to bring a claim within the employment tribunals.  Alt-
hough it is less complicated to bring a claim where injury is caused by a for-
eign subsidiary of a United Kingdom corporation,173 bringing a claim in this 
forum used to be expensive.174  In 2017, however, the UK Supreme Court 
ruled that requiring fees for employment tribunals was unconstitutional.175  
The Court made this decision based on the fact that 79% fewer cases were 
brought for three years following the government’s introduction of fees up to 
£1,200.176  The United Kingdom, therefore, has actually improved access to 
remedy for employment-related cases in the past year.  Considering the pre-
viously mentioned shortcomings in the UK’s remedial scheme, this is the best 
example of how the United Kingdom has heeded the requirements of the 
UNGP by facilitating access to remedy for victims of human rights violations. 
 
B. Limitations on Non-Judicial Remedies 
 
The primary non-judicial method for victims to bring claims for human 
rights violations by multinational corporations is the National Contact Point 
system.  From 2001 to 2015, the United Kingdom had the highest amount of 
complaints filed of any other country with a National Contact Point System.177  
This statistic is encouraging because it suggests that the UK’s National Con-
tact Point System is accessible to victims of human rights violations and that 
 
 172 Id. 
 173   An employment tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with claims where: (i) 
the respondent or one of the respondents resides or carries on business in 
the UK; (ii) one or more of the acts or omissions complained of took 
place in the UK; (iii) the claim relates to a contract under which the work 
is or has been performed partly in the UK; or (iv) there is a connection 
with the UK. 
Id.  at 26. 
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 177 See Daniel et al., supra note 21, at 15. 
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the United Kingdom is adequately informing potential victims of this method 
of attaining remedy.  The National Contact Point is particularly relevant for 
claimants who may not have standing to bring their claim in court.178  Also, 
the National Contact Point can actually be more inclusive than the judicial 
system because it does not discriminate against claims filed against subsidiar-
ies of businesses domiciled in the United Kingdom.179  Although the UK Na-
tional Contact Point system may be more accessible than the systems of other 
countries, claimants still face major barriers.  One barrier that claimants en-
counter when they go through the National Contact Point system is that there 
is no appeal process after the National Contact Point chooses not to proceed 
with a claim.180  And if the claimants are allowed to proceed with the claim, 
they might incur exorbitant costs.181  National Contact Points often require 
claimants to pay for “services that are a necessary part of the complaint pro-
cess and should be provided by the mechanism itself, such as the translation 
of key documents.”182 
Victims of human rights violations seeking redress through the United 
Kingdom National Contact Point also may be stalled by “high evidential 
thresholds.”183  The National Contact Point System requires that complain-
ants: 
[1.] Show that the link between the activities of the company 
and the issue raised is substantiated; 
[2.] And/or show that the link between the company’s obliga-
tions under the Guidelines and the issue raised has been sub-
stantiated; 
[3.] Have adequate sources and sufficient evidence; and 
[4.] On occasion, to meet additional evidential burdens.184 
 
 178 McCorquodale, supra note 38, at 32. 
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    183  Obstacle Course: How the UK’s National Contact Point Handles Human Rights Com-
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 184 Id. 
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This high threshold was evidenced by the case of Crude Accountability et 
al v. KPO Consortium,185 in which the National Contact Point decided that 
the environmental and social impacts of an oil and gas company’s activities 
on a village in Kazakhstan “were not directly related to the company’s opera-
tions but to the state, because the obligations to resettle under Kazakh law fell 
to the government.”186  As Amnesty International astutely pointed out in its 
assessment of the UK’s National Contact Point System, “[t]his misses the 
point that the human rights impacts were caused by the consortium’s activi-
ties.”187  It is essential and commonly understood that companies can contrib-
ute to human rights abuses,188 and in this case, it appears that the National 
Contact Point was attempting to skirt around that basic truth by finding claim-
ants had not satisfied the burden of proof because fault actually belonged to 
the government. 
In contrast to how the UK’s National Contact Point is conducting itself, 
the OECD guidelines require National Contact Points to deal with complaints 
in a way that is impartial, predictable, equitable, and compatible with the 
guidelines.189  The UK’s National Contact Point System is primarily run by 
civil servants with no specific human rights expertise.190  This could be a con-
tributing factor to the requirement of such a high evidentiary threshold be-
cause individuals with no experience in human rights might not have an 
awareness of the difficulties victims face in attaining all the relevant evidence.  
If complainants do provide sufficient evidence and the National Contact Point 
system finds in their favor, the National Contact Point system will release a 
statement that might include a recommendation on how the company can im-
prove; however, this statement has no binding effect on companies and the 
corporation might therefore not have an incentive to discontinue their harmful 
behavior.191 
The National Contact Point System could be modified in a few ways that 
would reduce the barriers that claimants currently face when attempting to 
utilize this system.  First, the United Kingdom should provide an appeal 
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process that would allow claimants whose claims are initially denied to have 
a second attempt to convince the National Contact Point that they have a mer-
itorious case.  This would provide claimants with limited resources more time 
to gather sufficient evidence to prove their injury and the multinational cor-
poration’s liability.  To implement an appeals process, the United Kingdom 
may have to provide more funding for the National Contact Point System.  
This would be advisable for many reasons.  The National Contact Point Sys-
tem is potentially the only venue for claimants to obtain relief, especially if 
they are unable to prove standing in the UK court system.  Therefore, it is 
extremely important claimants have a fair shot at successfully bringing a claim 
in this system.  Providing more funding would also potentially allow the Na-
tional Contact Point to institute an appeals process, making the system more 
equitable, which is required by the OECD Guidelines.192  Additionally, bol-
stered funding would allow the National Contact Point to hire staff with spe-
cific human rights experience, which would ensure impartiality and guard 
against inequity in the process.  The United Kingdom should also consider 
lowering the burden of proof on behalf of claimants attempting to obtain rem-
edy through the National Contact Point System.  Again, one way to do this 
would be to allow individuals with human rights experience to participate in 
deciding the merit of claims.  This would guarantee that meritorious claims 
are not being filtered out by unreasonably high evidentiary standards and 
would provide more predictability, per the OECD guidelines,193 because in-
formed individuals would most likely be able to set a consistent evidentiary 
standard. 
Although the National Contact Point System is incapable of binding mul-
tinational corporations to its decisions, there are concrete steps it could take 
to deter corporations from violating human rights in the future.  One way the 
National Contact Point System could hold companies accountable is by mak-
ing an effort to publicize a multinational corporation’s refusal to cooperate 
with the decision and recommendations made by the National Contact Point 
System.  Currently, the National Contact Point publishes a final statement as 
to its conclusions.194  In order to deter companies from behaving in violation 
of human rights, it would be wise for the National Contact Point to make it 
publicly known when a multinational corporation ignores the suggestions 
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made by the National Contact Point.  This would incentivize corporations to 
address their mistakes because the consequences of not doing so may include 
major reputational harm.  Other countries have also allowed their National 
Contact Point Systems to “exert greater leverage by preventing or enabling 
access to support including import or export licenses, government subsidies, 
qualification for government procurement, and export credit and trade financ-
ing support.”195  The UK National Contact Point should utilize this method as 
a consequence for companies not responding to recommendations because it 
would serve as an excellent deterrent for future harmful conduct. 
Victims who pursue claims through the Gangmasters Licensing Authority 
do so specifically in the context of the “agriculture, horticulture, dairy farm-
ing, livestock, shellfish gathering and associated food processing and packag-
ing sectors.”196  Under the Gangmasters Licensing Act, a gangmaster can be 
held liable for operating without a license, but not for violating human 
rights.197  The primary barrier in this remedial scheme is simple: individuals 
cannot pursue human rights violations perpetrated by gangmasters.  Individu-
als can, however, bring claims for serious human rights violations through a 
tort claim, and if not, potentially through the National Contact Point System.  
Therefore, this barrier is negligible in comparison to the more serious limita-
tions considered elsewhere in this Note. 
In certain circumstances, victims of human rights abuses might bring a 
claim through the Equality and Human Rights Commission.  The Equality and 
Human Rights Commission operates specifically to hold public bodies ac-
countable for human rights violations.  Claimants pursuing remedy through 
this structure are limited in the sense the Commission only intervenes regard-
ing claims against public bodies or where a case taken by another entity raises 
an issue of public concern.198  A claim brought through an Ombudsman office 
is similarly limited in that this grievance mechanism is only applicable against 
public authorities.  This is not really a barrier at all, because claimants to 
whom this limitation applies will most likely be more successful in bringing 
a claim through the judiciary or through the National Contact Point System. 
The only barrier claimants might encounter when dealing with the Grocer-
ies Code Adjudicator is that these types of claims are specifically for a sup-
plier/retailer agreement, and therefore for a contractual obligation.199  As is 
the case for all claims based on contract, this barrier is negligible because 
claimants who want to bring a claim outside of the contract-based context may 
do so through the judicial system or the UK National Contact Point. 
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C.  Limitations on Business/Internal Grievance Mechanisms in the United 
Kingdom 
 
According to the UNGP, in order for grievance mechanisms to live up to 
the standards of the framework, they must be “[l]egitimate . . . [a]ccessible . . . 
[p]redictable . . . [e]quitable . . . [t]ransparent . . . [r]ights-compatible [and a] 
source of continuous learning.”200  According to the Institute for Human 
Rights and Business, operational-level remedial mechanisms should “identify 
problems early, before they escalate, and provide solutions that include rem-
edy to anyone impacted.”201  Data is limited as to particular grievance mech-
anisms that exist in UK multinational corporations.  Although multinational 
corporations might have some incentive to provide grievance mechanisms to 
avoid judicial redress, the United Kingdom does not have any hard law that 
requires corporations to implement and maintain grievance mechanisms for 
victims of human rights violations.  The United Kingdom does have statutes 
that require due diligence, such as the Modern Slavery Act of 2015, which 
requires UK companies with a turnover threshold of more than £36 million to 
provide an annual public statement which details the efforts the company has 
made to ensure that it is not promoting slavery or human trafficking.202  It 
would be feasible for other countries to follow the UK’s example and imple-
ment similar hard law aimed at ensuring that multinational corporations are 
providing adequate operational-level remedies. 
The UK’s National Action Plan promised to “support, motivate and incen-
tivise [sic] UK businesses to meet their responsibility to respect human rights 
throughout their operations both at home and abroad.”203  As previously 
stated, the Updated National Action Plan affirmed the government of the 
United Kingdom would implement this support, motivation, and incentive 
system by disseminating lessons from the 2012 experience of the London Or-
ganising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, working with the 
UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) teams to inform UK companies about 
grievance mechanisms, encouraging companies to provide grievance mecha-
nisms for victims harmed in other jurisdictions, and supporting projects relat-
ing to work on providing remedies in other countries.204  Although the United 
Kingdom promised to follow through with this system of informing UK com-
panies on proper grievance mechanisms, it is unclear how it has done so and 
whether or not there has been any success in this program.  The United King-
dom would be wise to follow through with this regime.  However, the more 
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effective method of ensuring that businesses comply with the UNGP as to 
operational-level grievance mechanisms would be to implement some hard 
law requiring corporations to adhere to a set of standards that would ensure 
claimants have a fair chance of attaining a remedy at the company-level. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Human rights violations by multinational corporations still occur at an 
alarming rate, despite the promulgation of the UNGP.  A huge part of the 
problem is that states are not providing adequate remedy to victims and are 
therefore not deterring multinational corporations from carrying on harmful 
behavior.  The United Kingdom’s response to the UNGP in particular has been 
insufficient in regard to remedy.  First, victims of human rights violations by 
multinational corporations that are domiciled in the United Kingdom encoun-
ter difficulty when attempting to bring a tort claim against foreign subsidiaries 
of major multinational corporations.  This limitation could be avoided by ex-
panding liability for multinational corporations and encouraging these busi-
nesses to exercise greater care in ensuring that human rights violations do not 
occur.  Additionally, the United Kingdom should consider amending statutes 
such as the Rome II Regulation and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punish-
ment of Offenders Act, even if only provisions specifically pertaining to hu-
man rights violations.  Doing so will allow claimants to have a fair shot when 
bringing a human rights claim in the United Kingdom and to obtain a suffi-
cient award of damages. 
In the non-judicial realm, the National Contact Point System is the primary 
mechanism that needs to be reformed so the United Kingdom will live up to 
the standards set by the UNGP.  The United Kingdom would be wise to pro-
vide more funding to the National Contact Point, making it possible for the 
system to hire individuals with experience in human rights.  This would also 
potentially allow for the extremely high burden of proof to be lowered, and 
for claims to be brought more easily.  Additionally, bolstering funding for the 
National Contact Point would allow for an appeals process to be put into place, 
making the system more equitable and predictable.  Because National Contact 
Point decisions are non-binding, the United Kingdom should also consider 
taking actions that would increase accountability for multinational corpora-
tions that have violated human rights.  Finally, the United Kingdom should 
institute hard law, requiring corporations to meet certain standards for their 
operational-level grievance mechanisms.  This would ensure the requirements 
of the UNGP are fulfilled and that victims of human rights abuses have ade-
quate access to remedies. 

